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Abstract
We describe a formalization of forcing using Boolean-valued models in the Lean 3 theorem prover,
including the fundamental theorem of forcing and a deep embedding of first-order logic with a
Boolean-valued soundness theorem. As an application of our framework, we specialize our construc-
tion to the Boolean algebra of regular opens of the Cantor space 2ω2ˆω and formally verify the
failure of the continuum hypothesis in the resulting model.
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Introduction
The continuum hypothesis states that there are no sets strictly larger than the countable nat-
ural numbers and strictly smaller than the uncountable real numbers. It was introduced by
Cantor [7] in 1878 and was the very first problem on Hilbert’s list of twenty-three outstand-
ing problems in mathematics. Gödel [14] proved in 1938 that the continuum hypothesis was
consistent with ZFC, and later conjectured that the continuum hypothesis is independent
of ZFC, i.e. neither provable nor disprovable from the ZFC axioms. In 1963, Paul Cohen
developed forcing [10, 11], which allowed him to prove the consistency of the negation of
the continuum hypothesis, and therefore complete the independence proof. For this work,
which marked the beginning of modern set theory, he was awarded a Fields medal—the only
one to ever be awarded for a work in mathematical logic.
In this paper we discuss the formalization of a Boolean-valued model of set theory where
the continuum hypothesis fails. The work we describe is part of the Flypitch project, which
aims to formalize the independence of the continuum hypothesis. Our results mark a major
milestone towards that goal.
† This is an extended preprint of a paper which was submitted to ITP 2019.
1 Corresponding author.
2 A formalization of forcing and the unprovability of the continuum hypothesis
Our formalization is written in the Lean 3 theorem prover. Lean is an interactive proof
assistant under active development at Microsoft Research [12, 41]. It implements the Cal-
culus of Inductive Constructions and has a similar metatheory to Coq, adding definitional
proof irrelevance, quotient types, and a noncomputable choice principle. Our formalization
makes as much use of the expressiveness of Lean’s dependent type theory as possible, using
constructions which are impossible or unwieldy to encode in HOL, much less ZF: Lean’s or-
dinals and cardinals, which are defined as equivalence classes of well-ordered types, live one
universe level up and play a crucial role in the forcing argument; the models of set theory we
construct require as input an entire universe of types; our encoding of first-order logic uses
parametrized inductive types to equate type-correctness with well-formedness, eliminating
the need for separate well-formedness proofs.
The method of forcing with Boolean-valued models was developed by Solovay and Scott
in ’65-’66 [35, 37] as a simplification of Cohen’s method. Some of these simplifications were
incorporated by Shoenfield [40] into a general theory of forcing using partial orders, and it
is in this form that forcing is usually practiced. While both approaches have essentially the
same mathematical content (see e.g. [26, 23, 28]), there are several reasons why we chose
Boolean-valued models for our formalization:
Modularity. The theory of forcing with Boolean-valued models cleanly splits into sev-
eral components (a general theory of Boolean-valued semantics for first-order logic, a
library for calculations inside complete Boolean algebras, the construction of Boolean-
valued models of set theory, and the specifics of the forcing argument itself) which could
be formalized in parallel and then recombined.
Directness. For the purposes of an independence proof, the Boolean-valued soundness
theorem eliminates the need to produce a two-valued model. This approach also bypasses
any requirement for the reflection theorem/Löwenheim-Skolem theorems, Mostowski col-
lapse, countable transitive models, or genericity considerations for filters.
Novelty and reusability. As far as we were able to tell, the Boolean-valued approach
to forcing has never been formalized. Furthermore, while for the purposes of an indepen-
dence proof, forcing with Boolean-valued models and forcing with countable transitive
models accomplish the same thing, a general library for Boolean-valued semantics of a
deeply embedded logic could be used for formal verification applications outside of set
theory, e.g. to formalize the Boolean-valued semantics of stochastic λ-calculus [38, 4].
Amenability to structural induction. As with Coq, Lean is able to encode extremely
complex objects and reason about their specifications using inductive types. However,
the user must be careful to choose the encoding so that properties they wish to reason
about are accessible by structural induction, which is the most natural mode of reasoning
in the proof assistant. After observing (1) that the Aczel-Werner encoding of ZFC as
an inductive type is essentially a special case of the recursive name construction from
forcing (c.f. Section 3), and (2) that the automatically-generated induction principle for
that inductive type is P-induction, it is easy to see that this encoding can be modified to
produce a Boolean-valued model of set theory where, again, P-induction comes for free.
We briefly outline the rest of the paper. In Section 1 we outline the method of Boolean-
valued models and sketch the forcing argument. Section 2 discusses a deep embedding of first-
order logic, including a proof system and the Boolean-valued soundness theorem. Section 3
discusses our construction of Boolean-valued models of set theory. Section 4 describes the
formalization of the forcing argument and the construction of a suitable Boolean algebra for
forcing  CH. Section 5 describes the formalization of some transfinite combinatorics. We
conclude with a reflection on our formalization and an indication of future work.
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1 Outline of the proof
ZFC is a collection of first-order sentences in the language of a single binary relation tPu,
used to axiomatize set theory. The continuum hypothesis can be written in this fashion as
a first-order sentence CH. A proof of CH is a finite list of deductions starting from ZFC
and ending at CH. The soundness theorem says that provability implies satisfiability, i.e. if
ZFC $ CH, then CH interpreted in any model of ZFC is true. Taking the contrapositive, we
can demonstrate the unprovability (equivalently, the consistency of the negation) of CH by
exhibiting a single model where CH is not true.
A model of a first-order theory T in a language L is in particular a way of assigning true or
false in a coherent way to sentences in L. Modulo provable equivalence, the sentences form a
Boolean algebra and “coherent” means the assignment is a Boolean algebra homomorphism
(so _ becomes join, @ becomes infimum, etc.) into 2 “ ttrue, falseu. The soundness theorem
ensures that this homomorphism v sends a proof φ $ ψ to an inequality vpφq ď vpψq. 2 may
be replaced by any complete Boolean algebra B, where the top and bottom elements J,K
take the place of true and false. It is straightforward to extend this analogy to a B-valued
semantics for first-order logic, and in this generality, the soundness theorem now says that
for any such B, if ZFC $ CH, then for any B-valued structure where all the axioms of ZFC
have truth-value J, CH does also. Then as before, to demonstrate the consistency of the
negation of CH it suffices to find just one B and a single B-valued model where CH is not
“true”.
This is where forcing comes in. Given a universe V of set theory containing a Boolean
algebra B, one constructs in analogy to the cumulative hierarchy a new B-valued universe V B
of set theory, where the powerset operation is replaced by taking functions into B. Thus, the
structure of B informs the decisions made by V B about what subsets, hence functions, exist
among the members of V B; the real challenge lies in selecting a suitable B and reasoning
about how its structure affects the structure of V B. While V B may vary wildly depending
on the choice of B, the original universe V always embeds into V B via an operation x ÞÑ xˇ,
and while the passage of x to xˇ may not always preserve its original properties, properties
which are definable with only bounded quantification are preserved; in particular, V B thinks
Nˇ is N.
To force the negation of the continuum hypothesis, we use the Boolean algebra B :“
ROp2ℵ2ˆNq of regular opens of the Cantor space 2ℵ2ˆN. For each ν P ℵ2, we associate the
B-valued characteristic function χν : N Ñ B by n ÞÑ tf | fpν, nq “ 1u. This induces what
V B thinks is a new subset Ăχν Ď N, called a Cohen real, and furthermore, simultaneously
performing this construction on all ν P ℵ2 induces what V
B thinks is a function from
ℵˇ2 Ñ PpNq. After showing that V
B thinks this function is injective, to finish the proof it
suffices to show that x ÞÑ xˇ preserves cardinal inequalities, as then we will have squeezed ℵˇ1
properly between N and PpNq. This is really the technical heart of the matter, and relies
on a combinatorial property of B called the countable chain condition (CCC), the proof of
which requires a detailed combinatorial analysis of the basis of the product topology for
2ℵ2ˆN; we handle this with a general result in transfinite combinatorics called the ∆-system
lemma.
So far we have mentioned nothing about how this argument, which is wholly set-theoretic,
is to be interpreted inside type theory. To do this, it was important to separate the mathe-
matical content from the metamathematical content of the argument. While our objective
is only to produce a model of ZFC satisfying certain properties, traditional presentations of
forcing are careful to stay within the foundations of ZFC, emphasizing that all arguments
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may be performed internal to a model of ZFC, etc., and it is not immediately clear what
parts of the argument use that set-theoretic foundation in an essential way and require mod-
ification in the passage to type theory. Our formalization clarifies some of these questions.
Finally, when working with Boolean-valued models, it is profitable to keep in mind the
following analogy, developed by Scott in [35]. A ready supply of complete Boolean algebras
B is obtained by taking the measure algebra of a probability space and quotienting by the
ideal of events of measure zero. Let M be a B-valued structure. A unary B-valued predicate
φ on M assigns an event to every element m of M, whose measure we can think of as being
the probability that φpmq is true. Specializing to the language of set theory, we can attach
to everym :M an “indicator function” λx, x P m which assigns to every x a probability that
it is actually a member ofm. Thus, by virtue of extensionality, we may think of the elements
of a B-valued model ofZFCas being “set-valued random variables”, or “random sets”2; see
[35] and [28] for details.
Sources
Our strategy for constructing a Boolean-valued model in which CH fails is a synthesis of
the proofs in the textbooks of Bell ([5], Chapter 2) and Manin ([27], Chapter 8). For the
∆-system lemma, we follow Kunen ([26], Chapters 1 and 5).
Viewing the formalization
The code blocks in this paper were taken directly from our formalization, but for the sake of
formatting and readability, we sometimes omit or modify universe levels, type ascriptions,
and casts. We refer the interested reader to our repository,3 which contains a guide on
compiling and navigating the source files of the project. In particular, there is a summary
file summary.lean containing #print statements of important definitions and duplicated
proofs of the main theorems.
2 First-order logic
The starting point for first-order logic is a language of relation and function symbols. We
represent a language as a pair of N-indexed families of types, each of which is to be thought
of as the collection of relation (resp. function) symbols stratified by arity:
structure Language : Type (u+1) :=
(functions : N Ñ Type u) (relations : N Ñ Type u)
2.1 (Pre)terms, (pre)formulas
The main novelty of our implemenation of first-order logic is the use of partially applied terms
and formulas, encoded in a parametrized inductive type where the N parameter measures the
difference between the arity and the number of applications. The benefit of this is that it is
impossible to produce an ill-formed term or formula, because type-correctness is equivalent
to well-formedness. This eliminates the need for separate well-formedness proofs.
2 In this analogy, given a universe of random sets, the purpose of the generic filter or ultrafilter in
forcing is then to simultaneously evaluate the outcomes of the random variables, collapsing them into
an ordinary universe of sets.
3 https://github.com/flypitch/flypitch
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Fix a language L. We define the type of preterms as follows:
inductive preterm : N Ñ Type u
| var {} : @ (k : N), preterm 0
| func : @ {l : N} (f : L.functions l), preterm l
| app : @ {l : N} (t : preterm (l + 1)) (s : preterm 0), preterm l
We use de Bruijn indices to avoid variable shadowing. A member of preterm n is a partially
applied term. If applied to n terms, it becomes a term. Every element of preterm L 0 is
a well-formed term. We use this encoding to avoid mutual or nested inductive types, since
those are not too convenient to work with in Lean.
The type of preformulas is defined similarly:
inductive preformula : N Ñ Type u
| falsum {} : preformula 0 -- notation 8K8
| equal (t1 t2 : term L) : preformula 0 -- notation
8»8
| rel {l : N} (R : L.relations l) : preformula l
| apprel {l : N} (f : preformula (l + 1)) (t : term L) : preformula l
| imp (f1 f2 : preformula 0) : preformula 0 -- notation ùñ
| all (f : preformula 0) : preformula 0 -- notation 8@18
--  f := f ùñ K, notation 8„f8
-- D f := „ @1 „f, notation 8D1 f8
A member of preformula n is a partially applied formula. If applied to n terms, it
becomes a formula. Implication is the only binary connective. Since we use classical logic,
we can define the other connectives from implication and falsum. Similarly, universal quan-
tification is our only quantifier.
Our proof system is a natural deduction calculus, and all rules are motivated to work
well with backwards-reasoning:
inductive prf : set (formula L) Ñ formula L Ñ Type u
| axm {Γ A} (h : A P Γ) : prf Γ A
| impI {Γ} {A B} (h : prf (insert A Γ) B) : prf Γ (A ùñ B)
| impE {Γ} (A) {B} (h1 : prf Γ (A ùñ B)) (h2 : prf Γ A) : prf Γ B
| falsumE {Γ} {A} (h : prf (insert „A Γ) K) : prf Γ A
| allI {Γ A} (h : prf Γ A) : prf Γ (@1 A)
| allE2 {Γ} A t (h : prf Γ (@
1 A)) : prf Γ (A[t // 0])
| ref (Γ t) : prf Γ (t » t)
| subst2 {Γ} (s t f) (h1 : prf Γ (s » t)) (h2 : prf Γ (f[s // 0])) :
prf Γ (f[t // 0])
A member of prf Γ A is a proof tree encoding a derivation of A from Γ. Note that prf is
Type- instead of Prop-valued, so different members of prf Γ A are not definitionally equal.
2.2 Completeness
As part of our formalization of first-order logic, we completed a verification of the Gödel
completeness theorem. Although our present development of forcing did not require it, we
anticipate that it will useful later to e.g. prove the downward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem for
extracting countable transitive models. Like soundness, it also serves as a proof-of-concept
and stress-test of our chosen encoding of first-order logic.
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For our formalization, we chose the Henkin-style approach of constructing a canonical
term model. In order to perform the argument, which normally involves modifying the
language “in place” to iteratively add new constant symbols, we had to adapt it to type
theory. Since our languages are represented by pairs of indexed types instead of sets, we
cannot really modify them in-place with new constant symbols. Instead, at each step of
the construction, we must construct an entirely new language in which the previous one
embeds, and in the limit we must compute a directed colimit of types instead of a union.
This construction induces similar constructions on terms and formulas, and completing the
argument requires reasoning with all of them. As a result of our design decisions, only a
few arguments required anything more than straightforward case-analysis and structural
induction. The final statement makes no restrictions on the cardinality of the language:
theorem completeness {L : Language} (T : Theory L) (ψ : sentence L) :
T $1 ψ Ø T ( ψ
2.3 Boolean-valued semantics for first-order logic
A complete Boolean algebra is a type B equipped with the structure of a Boolean algebra
and additionally operations Inf and Sup (which we write as
Ű
and
Ů
) returning the infimum
and supremum of an arbitrary collection of members of B. We use [,\, ùñ ,J, and K
to denote meet, join, material implication, and top/bottom elements. For more details on
complete Boolean algebras, we refer the reader to the textbook of Halmos-Givant [13].
§ Definition 1. Fix a language L and a complete Boolean algebra B. A B-valued structure
is an instance of the following structure:
structure bStructure :=
(carrier : Type u)
(fun_map : @{n}, L.functions n Ñ vector carrier n Ñ carrier)
(rel_map : @{n}, L.relations n Ñ vector carrier n Ñ B)
(eq : carrier Ñ carrier Ñ B)
(eq_refl : @ x, eq x x = J)
(eq_symm : @ x y, eq x y = eq y x)
(eq_trans : @{x} y {z}, eq x y [ eq y z ď eq x z)
(fun_congr : @{n} (f : L.functions n) (x y : vector carrier n),Ű
(map2 eq x y) ď eq (fun_map f x) (fun_map f y))
(rel_congr : @{n} (R : L.relations n) (x y : vector carrier n),Ű
(map2 eq x y) [ rel_map R x ď rel_map R y)
Above, “
Ű
(map2 eq x y)” means “the infimum of the list whose ith entry is eq applied to
x[i] and y[i]”.
Note that Boolean-valued equality is not really an equivalence relation, but “B thinks it
is”. One complication which then arises in Boolean-valued semantics is keeping track of the
congruence lemmas for formulas. However, as part of the soundness theorem shows, once
these extensionality proofs are provided for the basic symbols in the language, they extend
by structural induction to all formulas.
2.4 The soundness theorem
A soundness theorem says that a proof tree may be replayed to produce an actual proof
in the object of truth-values. When the object of truth-values is Prop, this says that a
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proof tree compiles to a proof term. When the object of truth-values is a Boolean algebra,
this says that the proof tree becomes an internal implication from the interpretation of the
context to the interpretation of the conclusion:
lemma boolean_soundness {Γ : set (formula L)} {A : formula L}
(H : Γ $ A) : @ M, (
Ű
γ P Γ, M[γ]) ď M[A]
Of course, we also formalized the ordinary soundness theorem. As a result of our design
decisions, the proofs of both the ordinary and Boolean-valued soundness theorems were
straightforward structural inductions.
3 Constructing Boolean-valued models of set theory
Throughout this section, we fix a universe level u and a complete Boolean algebra B :
Type u.
In set theory (see e.g. Jech [23] or Bell [5]), Boolean-valued models are obtained by
imitating the construction of the von Neumann cumulative hierarchy via a transfinite recur-
sion where iterations of the powerset operation (taking functions into 2 “ ttrue, falseu) are
replaced by iterations of the “B-valued powerset operation” (taking functions into B).
Since this construction by transfinite recursion does not easily translate into type theory,
our construction of Boolean-valued models of set theory is instead a variation on a well-
known encoding originally due to Aczel [1, 3, 2]. This encoding was adapted by Werner [42]
to encode ZFC into Coq, whose metatheory is close to that of Lean. Werner’s construction
was implemented in Lean’s mathlib by Carneiro, as part of [9]. In this approach, one takes
a universe of types Type u as the starting point and then imitates the cumulative hierarchy
by constructing the inductive type
inductive pSet : Type (u+1)
| mk (α : Type u) (A : α Ñ pSet) : pSet
The Aczel-Werner encoding is closely related to the recursive definition of names, which is
used in forcing to construct forcing extensions:
§ Definition 2. Let P be a partial order (which one thinks of as a collection of forcing
conditions). A P -name is a collection of pairs py, pq where y is a P -name and p : P .
If P consists of only one element, then a P -name is specified by essentially the same
information as a member of the inductive type pSet above. Conversely, specializing P to
an arbitrary complete Boolean algebra B, we generalize the definition of pSet.mk so that
elements are recursively assigned Boolean truth-values:
inductive bSet (B : Type u) [complete_boolean_algebra B] : Type (u+1)
| mk (α : Type u) (A : α Ñ bSet) (B : α Ñ B) : bSet
Thus bSet B is the type of B-names, and will be the underlying type of our Boolean-valued
model of set theory. For convenience, if x : bSet B and x := xα, A, By, we put x.type
:= α, x.func := A, x.bval := B.
3.1 Boolean-valued equality and membership
In pSet, equivalence of sets is defined by structural recursion as follows: two sets x and y
are equivalent if and only if for every w P x, there exists a w1 P y such that w is equivalent to
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w1, and vice-versa. Analogously, by translating quantifiers and connectives into operations
on B, Boolean-valued equality is defined in the same way:
def bv_eq : @ (x y : bSet B), B
| xα, A, By xα1, A1, B1y :=
(
Ű
a : α, B a ùñ
Ů
a1, B1 a1 [ bv_eq (A a) (A1 a1)) [
(
Ű
a1 : α1, B1 a1 ùñ
Ů
a, B a [ bv_eq (A a) (A1 a1))
We abbreviate bv_eq with the infix operator =B. With equality in place, it is easy to
define membership by translating “x is a member of y if and only if there exists a w indexed
by the type of y such that x “ w.” As with equality, we denote B-valued membership by PB.
def mem : bSet B Ñ bSet B Ñ B
| a xα1 A1 B1y :=
Ů
a1, B1 a1 [ a =B A1 a1
3.2 Automation and metaprogramming for reasoning in B
As Scott stresses in [36], “A main point ... is that the well-known algebraic characterizations
of [complete Heyting algebras] and [complete Boolean algebras] exactly mimic the rules of
deduction in the respective logics.” Indeed, that is really why the Boolean-valued soundness
theorem is true. One thinks of the ď symbol in an inequality of Boolean truth-values
as a turnstile in a proof state: the conjunctands on the left as a list of assumptions in
context, and the quantity on the right as the goal. For example, given a b : B, the identity
pa ñ bq [ a ď b could be proven by unfolding the definition of material implication, but it
is really just modus ponens; similarly, given an indexed family a : I Ñ B,
Ů
i, a i ď
b Ø @ i, a i ď b is just D-elimination.
Difficulties arise when the statements to be proved become only slightly more complicated.
Consider the following example, which should be “by assumption”:
@ a b c d e f g: B, (d [ e) [ (f [ g [ ((b [ a) [ c)) ď a
or slightly less trivially, the following example where the goal is attainable by “just applying
a hypothesis to an assumption”
@ a b c d : B, (a ùñ b) [ c [ (d [ a) ď b
There are three ways to deal with goals like these, which approximately describe the
evolution of our approach. First, one can try using the basic lemmas in mathlib, using
the simplifier to normalize expressions, and performing clever rewrites with the deduction
theorem.4 Second, one can take the LCF-style approach and expand the library of lemmas
with increasingly sophisticated derived inference rules. Third, one can make the following
observation:
§ Lemma 3 (Yoneda lemma for posets). Let pP,ďq be a partially ordered set. Let a b : P .
Then a ď b if and only if @Γ : P,Γ ď aÑ Γ ď b.
This is a consequence of the Yoneda lemma for partially ordered sets, and its proof is utterly
trivial. However, one side of the equivalence is much easier for Lean to reason with. Take
the example which should have been “by assumption”. The following proof, in which the
user navigates down the binary tree of nested [s, will work:
4 The deduction theorem in a Boolean algebra says that for all a, b and c, a[ b ď c ðñ a ď bñ c.
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example {a b c d e f g : B} : (d [ e) [ (f [ g [((b [ a)[ c)) ď a :=
by {apply inf_le_right_of_le, apply inf_le_right_of_le,
apply inf_le_left_of_le, apply inf_le_right_of_le, refl}
But if we use the right-hand side of Lemma 3 instead, then after some preprocessing,
assumption will literally work:
example {a b c d e f g : B} : (d [ e) [ (f [ g [((b [ a)[ c)) ď a :=
by {tidy_context, assumption}
-- 8tidy_context8 applies 8poset_yoneda8, introduces a hypothesis 8H8,
-- uses 8simp8 at H to convert [s to ^s, and automatically splits
/- Goal state before 8assumption8:
[...]
H_right_right_left_left : Γ ď b,
H_right_right_left_right : Γ ď a
$ Γ ď a -/
A key feature of Lean is that it is its own metalanguage, allowing for seamless in-line
definitions of custom tactics. This feature was an invaluable asset, as it allowed the rapid
development of a custom tactic library for simulating natural-deduction style proofs inside
B after applying Lemma 3. Boolean-valued versions of natural deduction rules like _/^-
elimination, instantiation of existentials, implication introduction, and even basic automa-
tion were easy to write. The result is that the user is able to pretend, with absolute rigor,
that they are simply writing proofs in first-order logic while calculations in the complete
Boolean algebra are being performed under the hood.
One use-case where automation is crucial is context-specialization. For example, suppose
that after preprocessing with poset_yoneda, the goal is Γ ď a ùñ b, and one would like
to “introduce the implication”, adding Γ ď a to context and reducing the goal to Γ ď b.
This is impossible as stated. Rather, the deduction theorem lets us rewrite the goal to Γ [
a ď b, and now we may add Γ [ a ď a. So we may introduce the implication after all,
but at the cost of specializing the context Γ to the smaller context Γ1 := Γ [ a. But now,
in order for the user to continue the pretense that they are merely doing first-order logic,
this change of variables must be propagated to the rest of the assumptions which may still
be of the form Γ ď _—which is extremely tedious to do by hand, but easy to automate.
3.3 The fundamental theorem of forcing
The fundamental theorem of forcing for Boolean-valued models [17] states that for any
complete Boolean algebra B, V B is a Boolean-valued model of ZFC. Since, in type theory,
a type universe Type u takes the place of the standard universe V , the analogous statement
in our setting is that for every complete Boolean algebra B, bSet B is a Boolean-valued
model of ZFC.
Bell [5] gives an extremely detailed account of the verification of the ZFC axioms, and we
faithfully followed his presentation for this part of the formalization. Most of it is routine.
We describe some aspects of bSet B which are revealed by this verification.
Check-names
§ Definition 4. From the definitions of pSet and bSet, one immediately sees that there is a
canonical map check : pSet Ñ bSet B, defined by
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def check : pSet Ñ bSet B
| xα,Ay := xα, λ a, check (A a), λ a, Jy
We call members of the image of check check-names,5 after the usual diacritic notation xˇ
for check (x : pSet). These are also known as canonical names, as they are the canonical
representation of standard two-valued sets inside a Boolean-valued model of set theory.6
The axiom of infinity
ω : bSet B is ωˇ. ω is defined in pSet to be the collection of all finite von Neumann ordinals,
which are defined by induction on N. While it is easy to show ωˇ satisfies the axiom of infinity
def axiom_of_infinity_spec (u : bSet B) : B :=
(∅PB u) [ (
Ű
i_x,
Ů
i_y, (u.func i_x PB u.func i_y))
it can furthermore be shown to satisfy the universal property of ω, which says that ω is a
subset of any set which contains H and is closed under the successor operation x ÞÑ xYtxu.
The axiom of powerset
§ Definition 5. Fix a B-valued set x = xα, A, by. Let χ : α Ñ B be a function. The
subset of x associated to χ is a B-valued set rχ defined as follows:
def set_of_indicator {x} (χ : x.type Ñ B) := xx.type, x.func, χy
The powerset Ppxq of x is defined to be the following B-valued set, whose underlying
type is the type of all functions x.type Ñ B:
def bv_powerset (u : bSet B) : bSet B :=
xu.type Ñ B, λ f, set_of_indicator f, λ f, set_of_indicator f ĎB uy
The axiom of choice
Following Bell, we verified Zorn’s lemma, which is provably equivalent over ZF to the axiom
of choice. As is the case with pSet, establishing the axiom of choice requires the use of a
choice principle from the metatheory. This was the most involved part of our verification
of the fundamental theorem of forcing, and relies on the technical tool of mixtures, which
allow sequences of B-valued sets to be “averaged” into new ones, and the maximum principle,
which allows existentially quantified statements to be instantiated without changing their
truth-value.
The smallness of B
We end this section by remarking that the “smallness” (or more precisely, the fact that B
lives in the same universe of types out of which bSet B is being built) is essential in making
bSet B a model of ZFC. It is required for extracting the witness needed for the maximum
principle, and is also required to even define the powerset operation, because the underlying
type of the powerset is the function type of all maps into B.
5 This terminology is standard, c.f. [17, 28].
6 We were pleased to discover Lean’s support for custom notation allowed us to declare the Unicode
modifier character U+030C (ˇ ) as a postfix operator for check.
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4 Forcing
4.1 Representing Lean’s ordinals inside pSet and bSet
The treatment of ordinals in mathlib associates a class of ordinals to every type universe,
defined as isomorphism classes of well-ordered types, and includes interfaces for both well-
founded and transfinite recursion. Lean’s ordinals may be represented inside pSet by defining
a map ordinal.mk : ordinal Ñ pSet via transfinite recursion; it is nothing more than
the von Neumann definition of ordinals. In pseudocode,
def ordinal.mk : ordinal Ñ pSet
| 0 := ∅
| succ ξ := pSet.succ (ordinal.mk ξ) -- (mk ξ Y {mk ξ})
| is_limit ξ :=
Ť
η < ξ, (ordinal.mk η)
Composing by check (Definition 4) yields a map check ˝ ordinal.mk : ordinal Ñ
bSet B. (We could just as well have defined ordinal.mk1 : ordinal Ñ bSet B anal-
ogously to ordinal.mk without reference to check, such that ordinal.mk1 = check ˝
ordinal.mk; the point is that there is a link between the metatheory’s notion of size and
order with that of the forcing extension.)
Cardinals in Lean are defined separately from ordinals as bijective equivalence classes of
types, but are canonically represented by ordinals which are not bijective with any prede-
cessor. We let aleph : ordinal Ñ ordinal index these representatives. For the rest of
this section, unadorned alephs (e.g. “ℵ2”) will mean either an ordinal of the form aleph ξ
or a choice of representative from the isomorphism class of well-ordered types, and checked
alephs (e.g. “ℵˇ2”) will mean the check ˝ ordinal.mk of that ordinal.
4.2 The Cohen poset and the regular open algebra
Forcing with partial orders and forcing with complete Boolean algebras are related by the
fact that every poset of forcing conditions can be embedded into a complete Boolean algebra
as a dense suborder. This will be the case for our forcing argument: our Boolean algebra is
the algebra of regular opens on 2ℵ2ˆN (we identify this space with the subsets of ℵ2 ˆ N),
and the poset of forcing condition embeds in this Boolean algebra as a dense suborder.
§ Definition 6. The Cohen poset for adding ℵ2-many Cohen reals is the collection of all
finite partial functions ℵ2 ˆ NÑ 2, ordered by reverse inclusion.
In the formalization, the Cohen poset is represented as a structure with three fields:
structure C : Type :=
(ins : finset (ℵ2.type ˆ N))
(out : finset (ℵ2.type ˆ N))
(H : ins X out = ∅)
That is, we identify a finite partial function f with the triple xf.ins, f.out, f.Hy,
where f.ins is the preimage of t1u, f.out is the preimage of t0u, and f.H ensures well-
definedness. While f is usually defined as a finite partial function, we found that in practice
f is really only needed to give a finite partial specification of a subset of ℵ2ˆN (i.e. a finite
set f.ins which must be in the subset, and a finite set f.out which must not be in the
subset), and chose this representation to make that information immediately accessible.
12 A formalization of forcing and the unprovability of the continuum hypothesis
§ Definition 7. Let X be a topological space, and for any open set U , let UK denote the
complement of the closure of U . The regular open algebra of a topological space X ,
written ROpXq, is the collection of all open sets U such that U “ pUKqK, equipped with
the structure of a complete Boolean algebra, with x [ y :“ x X y, x \ y :“ ppx Y yqKqK,
 x :“ xK, and
Ů
xi :“ pp
Ť
xiq
KqK.
The Boolean algebra which we will use for forcing  CH is ROp2ℵ2ˆNq. Unless stated
otherwise, for the rest of this section, we put B :“ ROp2ℵ2ˆNq.
§ Definition 8. We define the canonical embedding of the Cohen poset into B as follows:
def ι : C Ñ B := λ p, {S | p.ins Ď S ^ p.out Ď - S}
That is, we send each c : C to all the subsets which satisfy the specification given by c.
This is a clopen set, hence regular. Crucially, this embedding is dense:
lemma C_dense {b : B} (H : K < b) : D p : C, ι p ď b
Recalling that ď in B is subset-inclusion, we see that this is essentially because the image of
ι : C Ñ B is the standard basis for the product topology. Our chosen encoding of the Cohen
poset also made it easier to perform this identification when formalizing this proof.
4.3 Adding ℵ2-many distinct Cohen reals
As we saw in Definition 5, for any B-valued set x, characteristic functions into B from the
underlying type of x determine B-valued subsets of x. While the ingredients ℵ2 and N for
B are types and thus external to bSet B, they are represented nonetheless inside bSet B
by their check-names ℵˇ2 and Nˇ, and in fact ℵ2 is ℵ2ˇ .type and N is Nˇ.type. Given our
specific choice of B, this will allow us to construct an ℵ2-indexed family of distinct subsets
of Nˇ, which we can then convert into an injective function from ℵ2ˇ to N, inside bSet B.
§ Definition 9. Let ν : ℵ2. For any n : N, the collection of all subsets of ℵ2 ˆ N which
contain pν, nq is a regular open of 2ℵ2ˆN, called the principal open Ppν,nq over pν, nq.
§ Definition 10. Let ν : ℵ2. We associate to ν the B-valued characteristic function χν :
N Ñ B defined by χνpnq :“ Ppν,nq. In light of our previous observations, we see that each
χν induces a new B-valued subset Ăχν Ď Nˇ. We call Ăχν a Cohen real.
This gives us an ℵ2-indexed family of Cohen reals. Converting this data into an injective
function from ℵˇ2 to N inside bSet B requires some care. One must check that ν ÞÑ Ăχν is
externally injective, and this is where the characterization of the Cohen poset as a dense
subset of B (and moving back and forth between this representation and the definition as
finite partial functions) comes in. Furthermore, one has to develop machinery similar to that
for the powerset operation to convert an external injective function x.type Ñ bSet B to
a B-valued set which bSet B thinks is a injective function, while maintaining conditions on
the intended codomain. Our custom tactics and automation for reasoning inside B made this
latter task significantly easier than it would have been otherwise. We refer the interested
reader to our formalization for details.
4.4 Preservation of cardinal inequalities
So far, we have shown for B “ ROp2ℵ2ˆNq that bSet B thinks ℵˇ2 is smaller than PpNˇq.
Although Lean believes there is a strict inequality of cardinals ℵ0 ă ℵ1 ă ℵ2, in general
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we can only deduce that their representations inside bSet B are subsets of each other:
J ď ℵˇ0 Ď
B ℵˇ1 Ď
B ℵˇ2. To finish negating CH, it suffices to show that bSet B thinks ℵˇ0 is
strictly smaller than ℵˇ1, and that bSet B thinks ℵˇ1 is a strictly smaller than ℵˇ2. That is,
for cardinals κ, we want that the passage from κ to κˇ to preserve cardinal inequalities.
§ Definition 11. For our purposes, “X is strictly smaller than Y ” means “there exists no
function f such that for every y P Y, there exists an x P X such that (x,y) P f”. Thus, “X
is strictly smaller than Y” translates to the Boolean truth-value
-(
Ů
f, (is_func f) [
Ű
y, y PB Y ùñ
Ů
x, x PB X [ (x, y) PB f).
We abbreviate this with “X ă Y ”.
The condition on an arbitrary B which ensures the preservation of cardinal inequalities
is the countable chain condition.
§ Definition 12. We say that B has the countable chain condition (CCC) if every an-
tichain A : I Ñ B (i.e. an indexed collection of elements A :“ taiu such that whenever
i ‰ j, ai [ aj “ K) has a countable image.
We sketch the argument that CCC implies the preservation of cardinal inequalities. The
proof is by contraposition. Let κ1 and κ2 be cardinals such that κ1 ă κ2, and suppose that
κˇ1 is not strictly smaller than κˇ2. Then there exists some f : bSet B and some Γ ą K such
that Γ ď (is_func f) [
Ű
y, y PB κ1ˇ ùñ
Ů
x, x PB κ2ˇ [ (x,y) P
B f. Then one
can show:
lemma AE_of_check_larger_than_check :
@ β < κ2, D η < κ1, K < (is_func f) [ (ηˇ, β ˇ ) P
B f
The name of this lemma emphasizes that what was happened here is that, given this f and
the assumption that it satisfes some @-D formula inside bSet B, we are able to extract, by
virtue of κˇ1 and κˇ2 being check-names, a @-D statement in the metatheory. Using Lean’s
choice principle, we can then convert this @-D statement into a function g : κ2 Ñ κ1, such
that for every β, K < (is_func f) [ (g(β)ˇ , β ˇ ) PB f. Since κ2 ą κ1, it follows from
the infinite pigeonhole principle that there exists some η ă κ1 such that the g
´1ptηuq is
uncountable. Define A : g´1ptηuq Ñ B by Apβq :“ (is_func f) [ (g(β)ˇ , β ˇ ) PB
f. This is an uncountable antichain because if β1 ‰ β2, then the well-definedness part of
is_func f ensures that, since gpβ1q “ gpβ2q, the truth-value β 1ˇ “ fpgpβ1qq ‰
B fpgpβ2qq “
β2ˇ is K.
Thus, conditional on showing that B “ ROp2ℵ2ˆNq has the CCC, we now have that
cardinal inequalities are preserved in bSet B. Combining this with the injection ℵˇ2 ĺ PpNq,
we obtain:
theorem neg_CH : J = (N ă (ℵ1)ˇ [ (ℵ1)ˇ ă (ℵ2)ˇ [ (ℵ2)ˇ ĺ P(N))
The arguments sketched in subsection 4.3 and subsection 4.4 form the heart of the
forcing argument. Their proofs involve taking objects in Type u and bSet B, constructing
corresponding objects on the other side, and reasoning about them in ordinary and B-valued
logic simultaneously to determine cardinalities in bSet B. We have omitted many details
from our discussion, but of course, all the proofs have been formally verified.
14 A formalization of forcing and the unprovability of the continuum hypothesis
4.5 The unprovability of CH
We conclude this section by briefly describing how the previous results may be converted
into a formal proof of the unprovability of CH. We work in a conservative expansion ZFC1 of
ZFC with an expanded language LZFC1 with symbols for pairing, union, powerset, and ω. We
define ZFC1 to be precisely the ZFC axioms which were verified in the fundamental theorem
of forcing, along with specifications for the new function symbols. CH can then be written
as a deeply-embedded LZFC1 sentence (note the use of de Bruijn indices for variables)
def CH : sentence L_ZFC1 :=  D1 D1 (ω ă &1) [ (&1 ă &0) [ (&0 ĺ P(ω))
where ă and ĺ are abbreviations with the same meaning as in the previous section. Then
proving bSet B ( ZFC1 +  CH is a straightforward matter of checking that sentences
are interpreted correctly as Boolean truth values which we have already proved to be J.
Applying the contrapositive of the Boolean-valued soundness theorem yields the result.
5 Transfinite combinatorics and the countable chain condition
What remains now is to prove that ROp2ℵ2ˆNq has the CCC. There are several ways forward;
we chose a very general proof using the ∆-system lemma to show more generally that the
product of topological spaces satisfies the CCC if every finite subproduct does. Our proof
follows Kunen [26].
5.1 The ∆-system lemma
§ Definition 13. A family pAiqi of sets is called a ∆-system (or a sunflower or quasi-
disjoint) if there is a set r, called the root such that whenever i ‰ j we have Ai XAj “ r.
def is_delta_system {α ι : Type˚} (A : ι Ñ set α) :=
D(root : set α), @{{x y}}, x ‰ y Ñ A x X A y = root
The ∆-system lemma states that if we have an uncountable family of finite sets, there is
an uncounbtable subfamily which forms a ∆-system. In Lean this is formulated as follows.
(restrict A t is the restriction of the collection A to t).
theorem delta_system_lemma_uncountable {α ι : Type˚}
(A : ι Ñ set α) (h : cardinal.omega < mk ι)
(h2A : @i, finite (A i)) : D(t : set ι),
cardinal.omega < mk t ^ is_delta_system (restrict A t)
This theorem follows from the following more general statement, taking κ “ ℵ0 and θ “ ℵ1
(for cardinal numbers the operation c ^< κ or căκ is the supremum of cρ for ρ ă κ).
theorem delta_system_lemma {α ι : Type u} {κ θ : cardinal}
(hκ : cardinal.omega ď κ) (hκθ : κ < θ) (hθ : is_regular θ)
(hθ_le : @(c < θ), c ^< κ < θ) (A : ι Ñ set α)
(hA : θ ď mk ι) (h2A : @i, mk (A i) < κ) :
D(t : set ι), mk t = θ ^ is_delta_system (restrict A t)
We omit the proof, referring the interested reader to [26] or the formalization.
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5.2 ROp2ℵ2ˆNq has the countable chain condition
§ Definition 14. We say that a topological space X satisfies the countable chain condition
if every family of pairwise disjoint open sets is countable.
We first give a sufficient condition for a product of topological spaces to satisfy the
countable chain condition.
§ Theorem 15. If we have a family pXiqiPI of topological spaces, then
ś
iPI Xi has the
countable chain condition if for every finite J Ď I the product
ś
iPJ Xi has the countable
chain condition.
Proof. For the proof, suppose we had an uncountable family of pairwise disjoint open subsets
Uk of
ś
iPI Xi. By shrinking Uk, we may assume that each Uk is a basic open set of the formś
iPFk
Uk,i ˆ
ś
iRFk
Xi for some finite set Fk. Now the pFkqk form a uncountable family of
finite sets, so by the ∆-system lemma we know that there is an uncountable family K of
indices such that pFkqkPK forms a ∆-system with root J . Now we can take the projections
pipUkq onto
ś
iPJ Xi for k P K. We can show this forms an uncountable disjoint family of
opens in
ś
iPJ Xi, contradicting the assumption. đ
With this, the rest of the proof that B “ ROp2ℵ2ˆNq has the CCC is easy: since every
finite product 2J is a finite topological space, and so satisfies the CCC, it follows that the
space 2ℵ2ˆN satisfies the CCC. Also, if a topological space X satisfies the CCC then the
algebra of regular opens satisfies the CCC, since every antichain of regular opens forms a
family of disjoint open sets. Thus, we have shown:
theorem B_CCC : CCC (regular_opens (set(ℵ2.type ˆ N)))
6 Related work
First-order logic, soundness, and completeness
There are many existing formalizations of first-order logic. Shankar [39] used a deep em-
bedding of first-order logic to formalize incompleteness theorems. Harrison gives a deeply-
embedded implementation of first-order logic in HOL Light [18] and a proof-search style
account of the completeness theorem in [19]. Margetson [33] and Schlichtkrull [34] use
the same argument for the completeness theorem in Isabelle/HOL, while Berghofer [6] (in
Isabelle) and Ilik [22] (in Coq) use canonical term models.
Set theory and forcing
Set theory is a common target for formalization. Notably, a large body of formalized set
theory has been completed in Isabelle/ZF, led by Paulson and his collaborators [32, 29, 30].
Most relevantly, this includes a formalization of the relative consistency of the axiom of
choice with ZF [31]. Building on this, Gunther, Pagano, and Terraf have begun formalizing
the basic ingredients of forcing [15, 16], taking the more conventional approach of generic
extensions of countable transitive models.
Our tactic library for Boolean-valued logic was inspired by work of Hudon [21] on Unit-B,
using similar techniques to embed a proof language for temporal logic [20]. It was pointed
out to the authors that a trick similar to Lemma 3 had also been successfully applied in the
Metamath library [8].
16 A formalization of forcing and the unprovability of the continuum hypothesis
The work we have described in this paper relies heavily on Lean’s mathlib. In particular,
the extensive set_theory and ordinal libraries contained nearly everything we needed
(including a treatment of cofinalities for the ∆-system lemma), with missing parts easily
accessible through existing lemmas. These libraries were originally developed by Carneiro
[9], in part to show that Lean proves the existence of infinitely many inaccessible cardinals.
7 Conclusions and future work
Reflections on the proof
As our formalization has shown, for the purposes of a consistency proof, one can perform
forcing entirely outside of the set-theoretic foundations in which forcing is usually presented.
There is no need to work inside an ambient model of set theory, or to even have a ground
model of set theory over which one constructs a forcing extension. Instead, the recursive
name construction applied to a universe of types is key. The type universe, with its classical
two-valued logic and its own notion of ordinals, takes the place of the standard universe
of sets. These external ordinals are then represented in the internal ordinals of the forcing
extension by indexing the construction of von Neumann ordinals. With a clever choice of
forcing conditions B, this representation of ordinals will preserve cardinal inequalities and
force an uncountable set beneath PpNq.
In particular, pSet, being only another special case of the construction which produces
bSet B, is no longer a prerequisite for working with bSet B, but merely a convenient tool
for organizing the check-names—this is the only role it played in the proof. The check-
names themselves were actually not necessary either: as we remarked, the canonical map
ordinal Ñ bSet B can be defined without reference to them. However, since in all of our
sources, pSet additionally played the role of the universe of types, and an interface for it was
readily available in mathlib, we started our formalization by following the usual arguments,
implementing these simplifications as we became aware of them.
Lessons learned
Originally, we thought set-theoretic arguments involving transfinite/ordinal induction,
which are ubiquitous, would be difficult to implement. In practice, Lean’s tools for well-
founded recursion and the comprehensive treatment of ordinals in mathlib made the
implementation of such arguments painless.
Definitions and lemmas should be stated as generally as possible. This maximizes
reusability, minimizes redundancy, and by exposing only the information required to
complete the proof, improves the performance of automation.
One should invest early in domain-specific automation. The formalization of the fun-
damental theorem was completed using only the first two strategies outlined in subsec-
tion 3.2; the calculations, while tedious, were recorded in our sources and it seemed easier
to follow them. If we had followed through on the observations around Lemma 3 and
developed the custom tactic library earlier, we would have saved a significant amount of
time.
Towards a formal proof of the independence of the continuum hypothesis
The work we have described in this paper was undertaken as part of the Flypitch project,
which aims to produce a formal proof of the independence of the continuum hypothesis. As
such, the obvious next goal is a formalization of the consistency of CH. Although it would
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be possible to do this using Boolean-valued models, we intend to develop the infrastructure
necessary to support a proof by forcing with generic extensions, as well as Gödel’s original
proof by way of analyzing the constructible universe L.
Although our work includes a formal proof of the unprovability of a version of CH from
a version of the ZFC axioms in a conservative extension of the language of ZFC, verifying
this is easy. What is more interesting is formalizing the equivalence of various common
formulations of ZFC and CH, so that a skeptical user may verify that their preferred version
of CH is unprovable from their preferred version of ZFC. This would require formalizations of
the conservativity of commonly-used extensions of ZFC, and of the equivalence of the various
ways to say that one set is strictly smaller than another. The proof of the completeness
theorem already required formalizing nontrivial conservativity statements, which shows that
our framework is well-equipped to support such results.
Although the stated goal of our project is to achieve a formal proof of the independence
of the continuum hypothesis, we also intend to develop reusable libraries for set theory and
mathematical logic. We have completed a formalization of forcing, but are nowhere near
completing a library which a set theorist could use to verify their research. Just as, more
than 50 years ago, Cohen’s proof marked the beginning of modern research in set theory, a
formal proof of the independence of the continuum hypothesis will only mark the beginning
of an integration of formal methods into modern research in set theory. This will require
robust interfaces for handling the diverse range of forcing arguments and for reasoning about
the consistency strengths of various extensions of ZFC, so that—to paraphrase Kanamori [24,
25]—deeply-embedded notions of truth and relative consistency become matters of routine
manipulation as in algebra. Our work demonstrates that such tasks are well within the
scope of modern interactive theorem provers.
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